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Abstract: Where the contract between a corporation and one of its creditors is
silent on some question, should the law invoke fiduciary duties or other extracontractual rights as a gap filler? In general, the law has declined to do so. There
is some precedent, however, for the proposition that directors of a corporation
owe fiduciary duties to bondholders and other creditors once the firm is in the
vicinity of insolvency.
Courts embracing the zone of insolvency doctrine have characterized the
duties of directors as running to the corporate entity rather than any individual
constituency. This approach is incoherent in practice and unsupportable in theory.
Courts should focus on whether the board has an obligation to give sole concern
to the interests of a specific constituency of the corporation. The leading argument
for imposing a duty on the board running to creditors when the corporation is in
the vicinity of insolvency is the claim that shareholders will gamble with the
creditor’ money. This Article demonstrates that this argument is unpersuasive. It
is director and manager opportunism, rather than strategic behavior by
shareholders that is the real concern. Because bondholders and other creditors are
better able to protect themselves against that risk than are creditors, there is no
justification for imposing such a duty.
This article also argues that the zone debate is much ado about very little. The
only cases in which the zone of insolvency debate matters are those to which the
business judgment rule does not apply, shareholder and creditor interests conflict,
and a recovery could go to directly to those who have standing to sue. In those
cases, as this Article explains, there is a strong policy argument that creditors
should be limited to whatever rights the contract provides or might be inferred
from the implied covenant of good faith.
Keywords: corporation, corporate governance, board of directors, fiduciary duties,
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I. Introduction
The two most basic questions of corporate governance are: (1) Who decides?
In other words, what organ within the corporation ultimately is in control? (2)
Whose interests prevail? When the ultimate decision maker is presented with a
zero sum game, in which it must prefer the interests of one constituency over
those of all others, which constituency prevails?
The latter question animates the corporate social responsibility debate. At one
end of the spectrum are those who contend corporations should be run so as to
maximize shareholder wealth. At the other end are stakeholderists, who argue that
directors and managers should consider the interests of all corporate
constituencies in making corporate decisions.1
*

Professor, UCLA School of Law.
As applied to corporation law and policy, the term “stakeholders” reportedly
originated in a 1963 Stanford Research Institute memorandum as a descriptive term for
“those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist.” R. Edward
Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on
Corporate Governance, 25 CAL. MGMT. REV. 88, 89 (1983).
1

1

2

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY LAW

In this article, I take up a subset of that larger debate; namely, the fiduciary
duties, if any, owed by directors to creditors of a corporation that is in the
“vicinity of insolvency.”2 In the dominant contractarian theory of the
corporation,3 corporate law is understood as providing a standard form contract
for the parties.4 In other words, where the actual contracts reflected in the
corporation’s organic documents are silent, the law fills in the gaps. In particular,
the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty owed to shareholders can be understood as
gap-fillers that complete the contract between the corporation and its equity
investors.5
2

See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991
WL 277613 at *34 (Del. Ch. 1991) (“At least where a corporation is operating in the
vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk
bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.”).
3
The nexus of contracts model treats the corporation as a nexus of contracts among
the various factors of production. See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF
ENTERPRISE 18 (1996) (describing the firm as “a nexus of contracts,” by which he means
that the “firm is in essence the common signatory of a group of contracts” among various
factors of production). Contractarians thus conceptualize the firm not as an entity, but as
an aggregate of various inputs acting together to produce goods or services. Employees
provide labor. Creditors provide debt capital. Shareholders initially provide equity capital
and subsequently bear the risk of losses and monitor the performance of management.
Management monitors the performance of employees and coordinates the activities of all
the firm’s inputs. The board supervises management and sets overall policy. See
generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and
Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 318-28 (1993); see also William T. Allen, Contracts and
Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) (former
Delaware Chancellor opining that the nexus of contracts model of the firm is now the
“dominant legal academic view”).
4
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1781 (2001) (“Contractarian
commentators … argue that corporate law is best understood as a kind of standard form
contract for governing relationships among officers, directors, and shareholders.”).
Providing a standard form contract, of course, is not the sole function of corporation law.
Law also provides institutional features that could not be effected by internal contracts.
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 406-23 (2000) (arguing that parties could not effect affirmative
asset partitioning by contract). The firm thus has both contractual and institutional
attributes.
5
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 92 (1991). Cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good
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The shareholder-corporation contract, however, is not the only one that is
incomplete. As with any relational contract, bond indentures and other long-term
debt agreements also inevitably prove incomplete. In a world characterized by
uncertainty, complexity, and bounded rationality, it cannot be otherwise.6 Where
the bond indenture is silent, should the law invoke fiduciary duties or other extracontractual rights as gap fillers? As we shall see, the law has declined to do so.7
As we shall also see, however, there is some precedent for the proposition that
directors of a corporation do owe fiduciary duties to bondholders and other
creditors once the firm is in the vicinity of insolvency.
Part II of this Article reviews the relevant legal rules. It begins with a review
of the precedents establishing the basic rule that directors have a fiduciary duty to
maximize shareholder wealth. It then turns to the precedents on fiduciary duties, if
any, owed to creditors.
Part III addresses the policy arguments. It begins by criticizing the framing
given the issue by Delaware courts. Those courts have characterized the duties of
directors as running to the corporate entity rather than any individual
constituency. This approach is incoherent in practice and unsupportable in theory.
Instead, courts should focus on whether the board has an obligation to give sole
concern to the interests of a specific constituency of the corporation. Part III then
reviews the leading argument in favor of imposing fiduciary duties to creditors
when the corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency; namely, the notion that
shareholders will gamble with the creditor’ money. I conclude that this argument
is unpersuasive. It is director and manager opportunism, rather than strategic
behavior by shareholders, which is the real concern. Part III concludes by arguing
that bondholders and other creditors are better able to protect themselves against
that risk than are creditors.
Finally, Part IV asks whether any of this matters very much. Even if the
fiduciary duties owed by directors shift in the vicinity of insolvency from
shareholders to creditors (or run to both in that setting), the vast majority of board
of directors decisions should continue to be insulated from judicial review by the
business judgment rule. Because I argue that the rule should apply even to
Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 1059, 1068-69 (1990) (arguing that “courts should treat an allegation of a breach of
a fiduciary duty as they would treat any other alleged breach of contract”).
6
See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 23 (1975) (arguing that,
under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, it becomes “very costly, perhaps
impossible, to describe the complete decision tree”).
7
See infra Part II.B.
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decisions in which the board makes trade offs between the interests of
shareholders and creditors (or declines to make such trade offs), the debate
arguably ends up being much ado about nothing (or, at least, about very little).
II. The Law
Corporate law does not mandate corporate social responsibility. To the
contrary, the real question is whether the law even permits corporate social
responsibility. Put another way, to what extent do the fiduciary duties of corporate
directors permit them to consider the interests of creditors and other
nonshareholder constituencies when making corporate decisions? After
establishing that the law allows directors to do so only to the extent such
consideration redounds to the best interests of the shareholders, this Part examines
the legal rules governing fiduciary duties to creditors, with particular attention to
the duties of directors of a corporation that is in the vicinity of insolvency.
A. The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm
Despite the obvious centrality of this problem to the operation of business
corporations, there are surprisingly few authoritative precedents on point.
Nevertheless, the law is reasonably well settled.
The law’s basic position on corporate social responsibility was famously
articulated in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.8 In 1916, Henry Ford owned 58% of the
stock of Ford Motor Co.9 The Dodge brothers owned 10%, with five other
individuals owning the remaining shares.10 Beginning in 1908, Ford Motor paid a
regular annual dividend of $1.2 million.11 Between 1911 and 1915 Ford Motor
also regularly paid huge “special dividends,” totaling over $40 million.12 In 1916,
Henry Ford announced that the company would stop paying special dividends.13
Instead, the firm’s financial resources would be devoted to expanding its
business.14 Ford also continued the company’s policy of lowering prices, while
improving quality.15 The Dodge brothers sued, asking the court to order Ford
8

170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
See id. at 669-70 (summarizing holdings of the parties).
10
Id.
11
Id. at 670
12
Id.
13
Id. at 671.
14
Id.
15
See id. at 682-84 (discussing Henry Ford’s plans for the corporation).
9

Bainbridge, Fiduciary Duties to Creditors

5

Motor to resume paying the special dividends and to enjoin the proposed
expansion of the firm’s operations.16 At trial, Ford testified to his belief that the
company made too much money and had an obligation to benefit the public and
the firm’s workers and customers.17
The plaintiff Dodge brothers contended an improper altruism18 towards his
workers and customers motivated Ford.19 The court agreed, strongly rebuking
Ford:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end,
and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to
the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other
purposes.20

Consequently, “it is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape
and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of
shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others.”21
16

Id. at 673.
See id. at 682-84 (summarizing Henry Ford’s testimony).
18
The term altruism is used herein to describe any decision motivated by
considerations other than shareholder wealth maximization. It thus includes, but also is
much broader than, the special case of corporate philanthropy.
19
See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671-73 (summarizing Dodge brothers’ allegations).
20
Id. at 684.
21
Id. For an interesting interpretation of Dodge, which argues that the shareholder
wealth maximization norm originated as a means for resolving disputes among majority
and minority shareholders in closely held corporations, see D. Gordon Smith, The
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998). I am skeptical of Smith’s
interpretation. In the first instance, the court’s own analysis in Dodge is not limited to
close corporations. Smith places considerable emphasis on the sentence immediately
preceding the court’s statement of the shareholder wealth maximization norm. See id. at
319 (using italics for emphasis). In that sentence, the court draws a distinction between
the duties Ford believed he and his fellow stockholders owed to the general public “and
the duties which in law he and his codirectors owe to protesting, minority stockholders.”
Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684 (emphasis supplied). On its face, the duty to which the court
refers is that of a director rather than the duties of a majority shareholder. (Concededly,
both the specific passage in question and the opinion in general are sufficiently
ambiguous to permit Smith’s interpretation.) In the second instance, whatever Dodge
originally meant, the evolutionary processes of the common law have led to Dodge being
interpreted as establishing a basic rule for boards of directors; namely, that the board has
17
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To be sure, a few cases posit that directors need not treat shareholder wealth
maximization as their sole guiding star. A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v.
Barlow,22 the most frequently cited example, upheld a corporate charitable
donation on the ground, inter alia, that “modern conditions require that
corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well as private responsibilities
as members of the communities within which they operate.”23 Ultimately,
however, the differences between Barlow and Dodge have little more than
symbolic import. As the Barlow court recognized, shareholders’ long-run interests
are often served by decisions (such as charitable giving) that appear harmful in
the short-run.24 Because the court acknowledged that the challenged contribution
thus could be justified on profit-maximizing grounds, its broader language on
corporate social responsibility is arguably mere dictum. In any event, Barlow
remains the minority view.25
Indeed, Dodge’s theory of shareholder wealth maximization has been widely
accepted by courts over an extended period of time. Almost three quarters of a
century after Dodge, for example, the Delaware Chancery Court similarly opined
in Katz v. Oak Industries:26 “It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the
law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”27 In
a duty to maximize shareholder wealth. As Smith himself concedes, moreover, his
interpretation departs from the “consensus” of most corporate law scholars. Smith, supra,
at 283.
22
98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
23
Id. at 586. See also Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404
(Del. Ch. 1969) (opining that corporate social responsibility is a desirable goal).
24
Barlow, 98 A.2d at 586. Despite its strong emphasis on the board’s obligation to
pursue shareholder interests, the Dodge court likewise recognized that, in many
situations, ethical or humanitarian considerations are wholly consistent with long-term
shareholder wealth maximization. Providing health care to employees costs money in the
short-run, for example, but in the long-run healthy employees with high morale may be
more productive. A board of directors thus may decide to incur such short-run costs in
order to reap long-term gains without fear of liability: “The difference between an
incidental humanitarian expenditure of corporate funds for the benefit of the employees,
like the building of a hospital for their use and the employment of agencies for the
betterment of their condition, and a general purpose and plan to benefit mankind at the
expense of others, is obvious.” Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich.
1919).
25
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 682 n.11 (1986) (discussing Barlow).
26
Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
27
Id. at 879.
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Long v. Norwood Hills Corp.,28 a Missouri court observed: “Plaintiff cites many
authorities [including Dodge] to show that the ultimate object of every ordinary
trading corporation is the pecuniary gain of its stockholders and that it is for this
purpose the capital has been advanced.”29 The court further stated that it had “no
quarrel with plaintiff insofar as the rules of law stated therein govern the actions
of majority stockholders and the boards of directors of corporations.”30 Setting
aside “a possible exception or two,” Robert Clark concludes that “courts have not
retreated from the assumption that the primary or residual purpose of a business
corporation is to make profits for its shareholders.”31
Dodge does not stand for the proposition that directors will be held liable for
considering the social consequences of corporate actions, however, despite its
strongly pro-shareholder wealth maximization rhetoric. To be sure, having found
that Ford had failed to pursue shareholder wealth maximization, the court ordered
Ford Motor to resume paying its substantial special dividends.32 Invoking the
business judgment rule,33 however, the Dodge court declined to interfere with
Ford’s plans for expansion and dismissed the bulk of plaintiff’s complaint.34
28

380 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
Id. at 476.
30
Id.
31
CLARK, supra note 25, at 682.
32
See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 685 (summarizing holding).
33
The business judgment rule, of course, pervades every aspect of corporate law,
from allegedly negligent decisions by directors, to self-dealing transactions, to board
decisions to seek dismissal of shareholder litigation, and so on. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (fiduciary duties of controlling shareholder);
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968) (operational decision); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979) (dismissal of derivative litigation). Two
conceptions of the business judgment rule compete in the case law. One treats the rule as
having substantive content. In this version, the business judgment rule comes into play
only after one has first determined that the directors satisfied some standard of conduct.
See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (holding that
plaintiffs rebut the business judgment rule’s presumption of good faith by “providing
evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision, breached any one of the
triads of their fiduciary duty—good faith, loyalty or due care”). Alternatively, the
business judgment rule is seen as an abstention doctrine. Under this version, the court
will abstain from reviewing the substantive merits of the directors’ conduct unless the
plaintiff can rebut the business judgment rule’s presumption of good faith. See, e.g.,
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. 1968) (holding that: “In a purely
business corporation ... the authority of the directors in the conduct of the business of the
corporation must be regarded as absolute when they act within the law, and the court is
29
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A similar result was reached in one of corporate law’s hoariest chestnuts,
Shlensky v. Wrigley,35 in which a minority shareholder in the Chicago Cubs sued
P.K. Wrigley, the team’s majority shareholder, over the latter’s famous refusal to
install lights at Wrigley Field. Shlensky claimed the decision against lights was
motivated by Wrigley’s beliefs that baseball was a day-time sport and that night
baseball might have a deteriorating effect on the neighborhood surrounding
Wrigley Field.36 Despite Shlensky’s apparently uncontested evidence that
Wrigley was more concerned with nonshareholder than with shareholder interests,
the Illinois Appellate Court dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.37 Although this result on superficial examination may
appear to devalue shareholder wealth maximization, on close examination the
case involves nothing more than a wholly unproblematic application of the
business judgment rule.38
To be sure, some scholars rely on such outcomes to argue that the business
judgment rule is intended to allow directors to make trade-offs between the
interests of shareholders and nonshareholder constituencies.39 In fact, however,
without authority to substitute its judgment for that of the directors.”). For reasons
developed elsewhere at length, I find the abstention version more persuasive. Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83
(2004).
34
See id. at 684 (“We are not, however, persuaded that we should interfere with the
proposed expansion of the business of the Ford Motor Company.”).
35
237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968).
36
Id. at 778.
37
Id. at 778-80.
38
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 971, 978-79 (1992) (discussing Shlensky).
39
See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 303 (1999) (arguing that the business judgment rule
authorizes directors to make trade offs between shareholder and nonshareholder
interests); Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgrind’s Education: Using Dickens
and Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 799, 831 (1997) (arguing that the business judgment rule reflects “an underlying
distrust of the strict fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder returns”). For an argument
that Blair and Stout misinterpreted the law in this area, see David Millon, New Game
Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law,
86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1009-20 (2000).
Some of these same scholars have argued that the so-called nonshareholder
constituency statutes adopted by many states (although not Delaware) call into question
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while that may sometimes be the effect of the rule, it is an unintended
consequence of operationalizing an entirely different policy goal. As the
Delaware Supreme Court has explained:
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the
fundamental principle, codified in [Delaware General Corporation Law] §
141(a), the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or
under its board of directors…. The business judgment rule exists to protect and
promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware
directors.40

On balance, this policy of judicial deference to the board of directors’ exercise of
discretionary authority redounds to the shareholders’ best interests, as I have
demonstrated elsewhere in detail,41 even though the rule occasionally allows
directors to escape liability in connection with decisions that failed to maximize
shareholder wealth.

the continuing validity of the shareholder wealth maximization norm. See, e.g., Blair &
Stout, supra, at 303 n.144; Greenfield & Nilsson, supra, at 838-39. As I have argued
elsewhere, however, these statutes do not entirely reject the traditional shareholder wealth
maximization norm. Instead, they modify the norm by allowing the board to make tradeoffs between shareholder and stakeholder interests. Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 989-96.
As such, the statutes admittedly work an unfortunate change in the basic normative
principles underlying corporate law. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1423, 1423-24 n.2 (1993). Fortunately, courts seem to be ignoring these statutes
and, at present, they appear to be little more than dust gathering relics of the 1980s wave
of state antitakeover legislation. See id. (noting the “dearth of cases”). The
nonshareholder constituency statutes were just another example of special interest
legislation adopted at the behest of union leaders and managers of target corporations to
protect important local businesses from takeovers. Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 993.
40
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). Cf. Marx v. Akers, 666
N.E.2d 1034, (N.Y. 1996) (noting that “shareholder derivative actions infringe upon the
managerial discretion of corporate boards…. Consequently, we have historically been
reluctant to permit shareholder derivative suits, noting that the power of courts to direct
the management of a corporation'
s affairs should be ‘exercised with restraint.’”); see also
Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (noting that “the derivative action impinges on the
managerial freedom of directors”).
41
Bainbridge, supra note 33, at 109-29.
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Courts have recognized that the business judgment rule rests on shareholderoriented policy considerations. In Joy v. North,42 for example, Judge Ralph
Winter explained that:
Although the [business judgment] rule has suffered under academic criticism, it
is not without rational basis. ... [B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the
potential risk, it is very much in the interest of shareholders that the law not
create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions. ... Shareholders can
reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their holdings. In the case of the
diversified shareholder, the seemingly more risky alternatives may well be the
best choice since great losses in some stocks will over time be offset by even
greater gains in others. ... A rule which penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier
alternatives thus may not be in the interest of shareholders generally.43

Delaware Chancellor William Allen advanced a slightly different, but still
shareholder-focused, rationale for the rule in Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc.44:
Corporate directors of public companies typically have a very small
proportionate ownership interest in their corporations and little or no incentive
compensation. Thus, they enjoy (as residual owners) only a very small proportion
of any “upside” gains earned by the corporation on risky investment projects. If,
however, corporate directors were to be found liable for a corporate loss from a
risky project on the ground that the investment was too risky ... their liability
would be joint and several for the whole loss (with I suppose a right of
contribution). Given the scale of operation of modern public corporations, this
stupefying disjunction between risk and reward for corporate directors threatens
undesirable effects. Given this disjunction, only a very small probability of
director liability based on “negligence”, “inattention”, “waste”, etc., could induce
a board to avoid authorizing risky investment projects to any extent! Obviously,
42

692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
Id. at 886. Or, as Chancellor Allen similarly observed in Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l,
Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996):
Shareholders can diversify the risks of their corporate investments. Thus, it is
in their economic interest for the corporation to accept in rank order all
positive net present value investment projects available to the corporation,
starting with the highest risk adjusted rate of return first. Shareholders don’t
want (or shouldn’t rationally want) directors to be risk averse. Shareholders’
investment interests, across the full range of their diversifiable equity
investments, will be maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly
assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted
returns available that are above the firm’s cost of capital.
Id. at 1052.
44
683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996).
43
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it is in the shareholders’ economic interest to offer sufficient protection to
directors from liability for negligence, etc., to allow directors to conclude that, as
a practical matter, there is no risk that, if they act in good faith and meet minimal
proceduralist standards of attention, they can face liability as a result of a
business loss.45

Drawing this distinction between the business judgment rule’s intent and
effect is supported by those cases in which the business judgment rule does not
apply, especially those involving a board of director’s response to an unsolicited
takeover bid. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,46 for example, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the board could consider “the impact of the bid
on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees,
and perhaps even the community).”47 In that case, however, a “corporate raider
with a national reputation as a ‘greenmailer’” faced Unocal’s board with a
structurally coercive bid.48 Accordingly, the directors reasonably believed that the
bid was not in the best interests of any corporate constituency and, on the facts
before the court, there arguably was no conflict between shareholder and
stakeholder interests.
Other situations are less clear. Suppose, for example, the bidder makes a fairly
priced, non-coercive offer, but also announces plans to close plants and lay off
numerous workers. The target’s board of directors reasonably concludes that the
negative impact on its employees exceeds the gains shareholders will garner. Did
Unocal permit the board to turn down such an offer?
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc.,49 the Delaware
Supreme Court answered that question in the negative, adding two crucial
provisos to Unocal. The first is of general applicability, forbidding the target’s
45

Id. at 1052.
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Several judicial opinions outside Delaware suggest that
boards may consider nonshareholder interests in making structural decisions. See, e.g.,
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Herald Co. v. Seawell,
472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972); GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assoc., 600 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985);
Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). It is difficult to form a
coherent picture from these cases, as most courts outside of Delaware face corporate law
issues on a sporadic basis, which precludes sustained doctrinal development. Cf.
Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The law in this
area is something less than a seamless web.”).
47
Id. at 955.
48
Id. at 956.
49
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
46
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board from protecting stakeholder interests at the expense of shareholder interests.
Rather, any management action benefiting stakeholders must produce ancillary
shareholder benefits.50 In other words, directors may only consider stakeholder
interests if doing so would benefit shareholders.51 Second, where a corporate
control auction triggering the so-called Revlon duties has begun, stakeholders
become entirely irrelevant. Instead, shareholder wealth maximization is the
board’s only appropriate concern.52 As such, when the business judgment rule
does not apply to insulate the directors’ decisions from judicial review, the board
will violate its fiduciary duty of shareholder wealth maximization if it considers
any interests other than those of the shareholders.53 In turn, this confirms that the
duty to maximize shareholder wealth is the principal obligation of directors, albeit
one as to which judicial scrutiny is sometimes barred by the business judgment
rule.
B. Fiduciary Duties to Creditors?
Consistent with the conclusions drawn in the preceding section, the dominant
view is that neither the corporation itself nor its officers and directors owe
fiduciary duties to bondholders or other creditors.54 Instead, “the relationship
between a corporation and the holders of its debt securities, even convertible debt
50

See id. at 182 (“A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging
its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the
stockholders.”). A somewhat weaker formulation was used in Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989), which allows consideration of
nonshareholder interests provided they bear “some reasonable relationship to general
shareholder interests.” Id. at 1282 n. 29.
51
Compare Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 231-32 (S.D. Ohio),
aff’d, 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987) (employee stock ownership plan invalidated because
there was “no evidence in the record as to how the ESOP would benefit the stockholders
nor as to how Ropak’s tender offer posed a threat to Buckhorn’s employees”) with
Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Co., 559 A.2d 257, 276 (Del. Ch. 1989) (employee
stock ownership plan upheld because it was “likely to add value to the company and all
of its stockholders”).
52
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
53
Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772, 786-87 (D.
Del. 1988); C-T of Virginia Inc. v. Barrett, 124 Bankr. 689 (W.D.Va. 1990); Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
54
See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504,
1524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988); Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
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securities, is contractual in nature.”55 The contract thus both defines and confines
the scope of the corporation’s obligations to its bondholders.
To be sure, a few cases purportedly hold to the contrary. Most of these cases,
however, involved fraudulent schemes or conveyances actionable outside the
bounds of corporate fiduciary obligation.56 Other cases in this genre involve
recharacterization of nominal debt securities as equity.57 Still others are mere
dicta.58
The limited extra-contractual rights of bondholders thus are provided solely
by the implied covenant of good faith found in all contracts. Katz v. Oak
Industries,59 for example, held that the implied covenant is breached when it is
clear from the express terms of the indenture that the parties would have
prohibited the challenged act if they had thought to negotiate about it:
[T]he appropriate legal test is not difficult to deduce. It is this: is it clear from
what was expressly agreed upon that the parties who negotiated the express terms
of the contract would have agreed to proscribe the act later complained of as a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith—had they thought to negotiate with
55

Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (analyzing cases).
57
See, e.g., Eliasen v. Green Bay & W. R.R. Co., 569 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Wis. 1982)
(discussing theory and cases). In Eliasen, the Class B debentures in question had
economic rights more closely resembling those of common stock than normal debt. The
Class B debentures had no right to regular payment of interest, but were paid interest only
when the board chose and only after the nominal stockholders had been paid, and the
debentures came last in a liquidation. The court nevertheless declined to treat the
debentures as the equivalent of stock because the Class B debentures had no voting rights
and, moreover, were originally issued in a reorganization of an insolvent debtor to
creditors who would have been entitled to nothing in a liquidation. Id.
58
The classic example is Green v. Hamilton Int’l Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), in which the court opined that “[a]s holders of convertible debentures, plaintiffs
were part of ‘the entire community of interests in the corporation—creditors as well as
stockholders’ to whom the fiduciary duties of directors and controlling shareholders run.”
Id. at 729 n.4 (quoting Justice Douglas’ famous dictum in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,
307 (1939)). The passage from Green is mere dicta because the court simply determined
that plaintiff’s claim of fraud under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 could survive a
FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. In addition, while Green purported to interpret
Delaware law, the Delaware Supreme Court specifically disavowed Green in Simons v.
Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303-04 (Del. 1988).
59
Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
56
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respect to that matter. If the answer to this question is yes, then, in my opinion, a
court is justified in concluding that such act constitutes a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith.60

The oft-cited Met Life decision likewise invoked an implied covenant of good
faith, although its treatment of that covenant differed somewhat from Katz.61 In
the latter, the Chancery Court suggested that an implied covenant of good faith is
part of every contract.62 In Met Life, however, the court suggested that a covenant
of good faith is implied only when necessary to ensure that neither side deprives
the other side of the “fruits of the agreement.”63 The court then seemingly limited
the fruits of the bond indenture to regular payment of interest and ultimate
repayment of principal.64 In any case, the court made clear that “the implied
covenant will only aid and further the explicit terms of the agreement and will
never impose an obligation which would be inconsistent with other terms of the
contractual relationship.”65 Consequently, the implied covenant will not give
bondholders any extra-contractual rights inconsistent with those set out in the
indenture.
Despite these and some minor semantic differences, however, the two cases
are quite similar in a number of respects. In particular, both Katz and Met Life
constrain the implied covenant of good faith by reference to the express terms of
the contract.66 Taken together, the two decisions reflect a basic principle, which
can be expressed colloquially as “you made your bed, now you have to lie in it.”
60

text.
61

Id. at 880. The facts of Katz are discussed infra notes 78-86 and accompanying

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989). Met Life arose out of the leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco by Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts & Co. The new RJR Nabisco debt issued to finance the LBO had the same
bankruptcy priority as RJR Nabisco’s pre-LBO debt. RJR Nabisco’s equity cushion thus
was substantially diminished and the value of the existing debt was substantially reduced.
The pre-LBO bondholders claimed that their contract rights had been violated. Because
the express terms of the contract had not been violated, the court focused on the implied
covenant of good faith.
62
Katz, 508 A.2d at 880.
63
Met Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1517.
64
See id. at 1518 (explaining that “the substantive ‘fruits’ guaranteed by” the
indenture “include the periodic and regular payment of interest and the eventual
repayment of principal”).
65
Id. at 1517.
66
Compare Katz, 508 A.2d at 880 (limiting the covenant to situations in which it is
“clear from what was expressly agreed upon that the parties who negotiated the express
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Do these rules change when the corporation is insolvent67 or nearly so? In
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.,68
Delaware Chancellor William Allen famously opined that:
At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of
directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to
the corporate enterprise.69

Or, as Vice Chancellor Leo Strine explained:
The obligation of directors in that context of high risk and uncertainty … was not
"merely [to be] the agent of the residue risk bearers" but rather to remember their
fiduciary duties to "the corporate enterprise" itself, in the sense that the directors
have an obligation "to the community of interest that sustained the corporation
...." and to preserve and, if prudently possible, to maximize the corporation'
s
value to best satisfy the legitimate claims of all its constituents, and not simply to
pursue the course of action that stockholders might favor as best for them.70
terms of the contract would have agreed to proscribe the act later complained of”) with
Met Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1517 (holding that the implied covenant may only be invoked to
“further the explicit terms of the agreement”).
67
See FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982) (stating that
"when the corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from
the stockholders to the creditors"); Henderson v. Buchanan (In re Western World
Funding, Inc.), 52 B.R. 743, 763 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985) (holding that when a
“corporation is insolvent” the fiduciary of directors “run to creditors”); Production
Resources Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790-91 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(“When a firm has reached the point of insolvency, it is settled that under Delaware law,
the firm'
s directors are said to owe fiduciary duties to the company'
s creditors. [FN58]
This is an uncontroversial proposition ….”); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621
A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992) (observing that “when the insolvency exception does
arise, it creates fiduciary duties for directors for the benefit of creditors”). On the question
of when a corporation is insolvent, see Zipora Cohen, Directors'Negligence Liability to
Creditors: A Comparative and Critical View, 26 J. CORP. L. 351, 377-79 (2001).
68
1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991).
69
Id. at *34. Cohen calls attention to “the distinction that exists between the theory of
the trust fund [applicable where the corporation is insolvent] and the ruling of the
Delaware Chancery Court in the Credit Lyonnais case. Whereas the former theory sees
the interests of the creditors as the sole interests which corporate directors are allowed to
take into account in situations of insolvency, the judgment in the Credit Lyonnais case
suggests consideration be given to the interests of the firm as a whole.” Cohen, supra
note 67, at 381.
70
Production Resources Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 788 (Del.
Ch. 2004).
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Admittedly, this approach has a certain superficial appeal. A corporation
presently in the vicinity of insolvency likely eventually will end up in bankruptcy
for either liquidation or reorganization. In bankruptcy, assuming the shareholders’
claim is wiped out, the creditors effectively become the residual claimants to the
corporation’s remaining assets. Because fiduciary duties generally are owed to
the residual claimant, there is an argument for extending fiduciary duties to the
creditors benefit.
Before one assumes that Credit Lyonnais is settled Delaware law, however,
consider this cautionary note recently advanced by former Delaware Supreme
Court Chief Justice Norman Veasey:
The Delaware Supreme Court has never directly addressed the vicinity of
insolvency issue, although one case involving the issue was appealed to the court
in 2000. The court affirmed the case on the basis of the Court of Chancery’s
opinion and expressly stated that it did not reach the issue of “whether or to what
extent directors of a corporation said to be in the so-called ‘vicinity of
insolvency’ owe fiduciary duties to preferred stockholders.” Thus, the questions
of what is the “vicinity of insolvency” and how must directors carry out their
fiduciary duties in that milieu are areas of future development in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence of fiduciary duties and the business judgment rule.71

At the very least, this passage must been seen as a signal that the issue remains
open; it may even signal that the issue is in some doubt.
III. The Policy
As noted earlier, many scholars reject the shareholder wealth maximization
principle on normative grounds; instead, they believe that, as a matter of sound
social policy, directors should have obligations to various nonshareholder
constituencies or, at the very least, be able to consider the impact of corporate
actions on those constituencies.72 In contrast, I have repeatedly defended the
shareholder wealth maximization norm on normative grounds.73 Accordingly, I do
not intend to rehash herein the general arguments in favor of the shareholder
71

E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware
Corporate Law and Governance From 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key
Developments, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 1399, 1432 (2005).
72
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
73
See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 419-29
(2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 574-92 (2003); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense
of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993).
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wealth maximization norm. Instead, I propose to focus on those arguments most
directly relevant to a corporation operating in the vicinity of insolvency.
A. A Duty to the Corporation?
Technically, Credit Lyonnais does not stand for the proposition that directors
of a corporation in the vicinity of insolvency owe fiduciary duties to creditors of
the corporation. Instead, Chancellor Allen held that the board of directors of such
a corporation “owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.”74 In a famous footnote,
Chancellor Allen went on to explain how such a duty differed from the usual
conception that directors owe their duties to the shareholders, which is worth
quoting at full length given its importance to the analysis:
The possibility of insolvency can do curious things to incentives, exposing
creditors to risks of opportunistic behavior and creating complexities for
directors. Consider, for example, a solvent corporation having a single asset, a
judgment for $51 million against a solvent debtor. The judgment is on appeal
and thus subject to modification or reversal. Assume that the only liabilities of
the company are to bondholders in the amount of $12 million. Assume that the
array of probable outcomes of the appeal is as follows:
Expected Value
25%
chance of affirmance
($51mm)
$12.75
70%
chance of modification
($4mm)
2.8
5%
chance of reversal
($0)
0
Expected Value of Judgment on Appeal
$15.55
Thus, the best evaluation is that the current value of the equity is $3.55
million. ($15.55 million expected value of judgment on appeal-$12 million
liability to bondholders). Now assume an offer to settle at $12.5 million (also
consider one at $17.5 million).
By what standard do the directors of the
company evaluate the fairness of these offers? The creditors of this solvent
company would be in favor of accepting either a $12.5 million offer or a $17.5
million offer. In either event they will avoid the 75% risk of insolvency and
default. The stockholders, however, will plainly be opposed to acceptance of a
$12.5 million settlement (under which they get practically nothing). More
importantly, they very well may be opposed to acceptance of the $17.5 million
offer under which the residual value of the corporation would increase from $3.5
to $5.5 million. This is so because the litigation alternative, with its 25%
probability of a $39 million outcome to them ($51 million - $12 million = $39
million) has an expected value to the residual risk bearer of $9.75 million ($39
74

Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL
277613 at *34 (Del. Ch. 1991).
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million x 25% chance of affirmance), substantially greater than the $5.5 million
available to them in the settlement. While in fact the stockholders'preference
would reflect their appetite for risk, it is possible (and with diversified
shareholders likely) that shareholders would prefer rejection of both settlement
offers.
But if we consider the community of interests that the corporation represents
it seems apparent that one should in this hypothetical accept the best settlement
offer available providing it is greater than $15.55 million, and one below that
amount should be rejected. But that result will not be reached by a director who
thinks he owes duties directly to shareholders only. It will be reached by
directors who are capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal and
economic entity. Such directors will recognize that in managing the business
affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may
arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the
corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors,
or the employees, or any single group interested in the corporation) would make
if given the opportunity to act.75

Former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Veasey has likewise embraced an
understanding of the problem centered on the notion that directors owe duties to
the corporate entity in this context, although we shall see that Veasey’s analysis
ultimately proves to be somewhat more nuanced:
… it is important to keep in mind the precise content of this “best interests”
concept—that is, to whom this duty is owed and when. Naturally, one often
thinks that directors owe this duty to both the corporation and the stockholders.
That formulation is harmless in most instances because of the confluence of
interests, in that what is good for the corporate entity is usually derivatively good
for the stockholders. There are times, of course, when the focus is directly on the
interests of stockholders. But, in general, the directors owe fiduciary duties to the
corporation, not to the stockholders. This provides a doctrinal solution to the
incentive problem that is entirely consistent with the emphasis on board
governance, namely, that the board’s duty is to do what is best for the
corporation.76

From a doctrinal perspective, this emphasis on fiduciary duties to the
corporate entity is essentially incoherent. As to solvent corporations, the law
already distinguishes between duties running to the corporate entity and to the
shareholders. This distinction is what differentiates direct from derivative

75
76

Id. at *34 n.55.
Veasey & Guglielmo, supra note 71, at 1431.
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shareholder litigation, after all.77 But if directors already owe some duties to the
corporate entity, what changes doctrinally when the corporation is in the “vicinity
of insolvency”?
Allen’s highly stylized hypothetical, moreover, conflates issues of pie
expansion and pie division. Suppose the board of directors was faced with a true
zero sum decision, in which the sole issue is how to divide a static sum between
two or more corporate constituencies. For all its detail, Allen’s analysis fails to
offer directors any guidance for making that decision. This is so because, in the
zero sum case, the value of the corporate entity by definition will be unaffected by
the decision.
Similarly, it is difficult to square Allen’s analysis here with his analysis in
Katz v. Oak Industries.78 Katz involved the common situation in which a debtor
attempts to avoid bankruptcy through a workout including an exchange offer with
bondholders. Oak undertook a drastic down-sizing and recapitalization involving
the sale of a major part of its business to Allied-Signal.79 The buyer also agreed to
purchase $15 million of newly issued common stock, but that obligation was
conditioned on a restructuring of Oak’s debt.80 Oak agreed to effect a series of
exchange offers in which at least 85% of Oak’s debt securities would get cash or
stock worth substantially less than the principal amount of their present
securities.81 Covenants in Oak’s indentures prohibited both the recapitalization
and the exchange offers.82 Accordingly, Oak had to obtain bondholder approval of
appropriate amendments to the various indentures.83 To do so, Oak required the
bondholders to consent to the requisite amendments as a condition of participating
in the exchange offer.84 Plaintiff objected to the transaction on the grounds that it
was “coercive.”85 Chancellor Allen framed the issue not as whether plaintiff was

77

See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, (Del. 2004)
(“The stockholder must demonstrate that the duty breached was owed to the stockholder
and that he or she can prevail without showing an injury to the corporation.).
78
Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
79
Id. at 876.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 877.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 879.
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coerced, but as whether such coercion, if any, was “wrongful.”86 He explained
why the issue must be so framed in the following passage:
… the first aspect of the pending Exchange Offers about which plaintiff
complains--that "the purpose and effect of the Exchange Offers is to benefit
Oak'
s common stockholders at the expense of the Holders of its debt"--does not
itself appear to allege a cognizable legal wrong. It is the obligation of directors to
attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation'
s
stockholders; that they may sometimes do so "at the expense" of others (even
assuming that a transaction which one may refuse to enter into can meaningfully
be said to be at his expense) does not for that reason constitute a breach of duty.
It seems likely that corporate restructurings designed to maximize shareholder
values may in some instances have the effect of requiring bondholders to bear
greater risk of loss and thus in effect transfer economic value from bondholders
to stockholders. But if courts are to provide protection against such enhanced
risk, they will require either legislative direction to do so or the negotiation of
indenture provisions designed to afford such protection.87

Instructively, “Oak'
s financial results” during the relevant time period showed “it
unmistakably to be a company in deep trouble.”88 It is thus quite difficult to
square Allen’s forthright recognition of the pie division issue in Katz with Credit
Lyonnais. It’s also quite difficult to square his forthright defense of shareholder
wealth maximization in Katz with the inherently ambiguous duty to the corporate
entity laid out in Credit Lyonnais.
It is worth noting in passing that it is also quite difficult to square Allen’s
notion of a duty running to the corporation in this context with the Delaware
Chancery Court’s well-known observation that “[i]t is obviously important that
the Delaware corporate law have stability and predictability.”89 Two key
ambiguities plague the Credit Lyonnais analysis. First, what does it mean to be in
the “vicinity of insolvency?”90 Second, as we have just seen, it is difficult to know
what content to ascribe to the duties that arise in that setting. Former Delaware
Chief Justice Veasey thus put it quite mildly when he observed that this “is
certainly an area where directors of troubled companies and their counsel face
particular challenges and need expert counseling.”91
86

Id. at 879-80.
Id. at 879.
88
Id. at 875.
89
Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 220 (Del. Ch. 1974).
90
See Veasey & Guglielmo, supra note 71, at 1430 (noting “the vicinity of
insolvency—whatever that is”; emphasis supplied).
91
Id. at 1432.
87
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In addition to being doctrinally incoherent, the notion that directors owe duties
to the corporate entity is inconsistent with the dominant contractarian theory of
the firm. The insistence that the firm is a real entity is a form of reification—i.e.,
treating an abstraction as if it has material existence.92 Reification is often useful,
or even necessary, because it permits us to utilize a form of shorthand—it is easier
to say General Motors did so and so than to attempt in conversation to describe
the complex process which actually may have taken place. Indeed, it is very
difficult to think about large firms without reifying them. Reification, however,
can be dangerous. It becomes easy to lose sight of the fact that firms don’t do
things, people do things.93
The corporation thus is not a thing to which duties to can be owed, except as a
useful legal fiction. Instead, in contractarian theory, the corporation is thought of
as a nexus of contracts.94 Although this is a very useful and important concept,
however, it too is somewhat misleading. After all, to say that the firm is a nexus is
to imply the existence of a core or kernel capable of contracting. But kernels do
not contract – people do. In other words, it does us no good to avoid reifying the
firm by reifying the nexus at the center of the firm. Hence, it is perhaps best to
understand the corporation as having a nexus of contracts.
If the corporation has a nexus, where is it located? The Delaware code, like
the corporate law of every other state, gives us a clear answer: the corporation’s
“business and affairs . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of the board
of directors.”95 Put simply, the board of directors is the nexus of a set of contracts
with various constituencies that the law collectively treats as a legal fiction called
the corporation.96 As such, it simply makes no sense to think of the board of
92

See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 117-18 (9th ed. 2004) (critiquing
reification of the corporation).
93
See G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 891 (2000)
(arguing that “it is dangerous to ignore the reality that firms transact only through
individuals”).
94
See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 18 (1996)
(describing the firm as “a nexus of contracts,” by which he means that the “firm is in
essence the common signatory of a group of contracts” among various factors of
production).
95
DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(a) (2000). For a summary of comparable state
corporation code provisions, see MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 8.01 at 8-10 (1997
supp.).
96
I developed this argument at length in Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of
Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2002).
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directors as owning fiduciary duties to the corporate entity. Indeed, since the legal
fiction we call the corporate entity is really just a vehicle by which the board of
directors hires factors of production, it is akin to saying that the board owes duties
to itself.
Former Chief Justice Veasey seemingly recognized at least some of these
difficulties with the formulation both he and former Chancellor Allen adopted.
For example, Veasey observed that:
… when a corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency … creditors may be
considered to be in the pool of residual owners, and therefore become
beneficiaries of the fiduciary duties owed to the residual owners. Creditors’
inclusion in the pool need not imply that stockholders are thereby excluded,
however.97

Likewise, he further observed that:
… the directors’ judgment could shade toward rights of creditors if that course of
action comports with the best interests of the corporate entity. Thus, it is
important to keep in mind the precise content of this “best interests” concept—
that is, to whom this duty is owed and when. … This means that, as the
corporation slides toward insolvency, the benefits of maximizing the value of the
corporation will shift from stockholders to creditors, but, on this view, the duties
of the board remain the same.98

In Veasey’s formulation, the directors’ duties to the shareholders thus morph
into a duty that somehow runs to both shareholders and creditors when the
corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency.99 While this solves the conceptual
difficulties with a duty running to the corporation, however, it introduces a new
problem; namely, the “two masters” issue.100 Suppose that the board of directors
is considering closing an obsolete plant. The closing will harm the plant’s workers
and the local community, but will benefit shareholders, creditors, employees at a
more modern plant to which the work previously performed at the old plant is
transferred, and communities around the modern plant. Assume that the latter
97

Veasey & Guglielmo, supra note 71, at 1430.
Id. at 1431.
99
Veasey does not explain why the fiduciary duties of directors “shade toward rights
of creditors” when the corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency, but not towards any of
the corporation’s many other stakeholders. Why, for example, does his formulation not
permit those duties not shade towards the firm’s workers, who obviously are adversely
affected by insolvency at least as much as creditors or shareholders? I have been unable
to find any Delaware precedent answering that question.
100
Cf. MATTHEW 6:24 (stating: “No one can serve two masters.”).
98
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groups cannot gain except at the former groups’ expense. By what standard
should the board make the decision? Shareholder wealth maximization provides a
clear answer—close the plant. Once the directors are allowed—or, required—to
deviate from shareholder wealth maximization, however, they must inevitably
turn to indeterminate standards balancing the interests of multiple parties. Veasey
recognized that such standards are highly problematic.101
Standards that require the directors to balance the interests of multiple
constituencies, shading between them from case to case, as Veasey puts it,
deprive directors of the critical ability to determine ex ante whether their behavior
comports with the law’s demands, raising the transaction costs of corporate
governance. The conflict of interest rules governing the legal profession provide a
useful analogy. Despite many years of refinement, these rules are still widely
viewed as inadequate, vague, and inconsistent—hardly the stuff of which
certainty and predictability are made.102
Second, absent clear standards, directors will be tempted to pursue their own
self-interest. Directors who are responsible to everyone are accountable to no one.
In the foregoing hypothetical, for example, if the board’s interests favor keeping
the plant open, we can expect the board to at least lean in that director. The plant
likely will stay open, with the decision being justified by reference to the impact
of a closing on the plant’s workers and the local community. In contrast, if
directors’ interests are served by closing the plant, the plant will likely close, with
the decision being justified by concern for the firm’s shareholders, creditors, and
other benefited constituencies.
One may celebrate the virtues of granting directors largely unfettered
discretion to manage the business enterprise without having to ignore the agency
costs associated with such discretion. Discretion should not be allowed to
camouflage self-interest. Whether one characterizes Credit Lyonnais as pointing
the directors’ duties towards the corporate entity or its shareholders, the decision
threatens to provide just such camouflage. The straightforward duty to
shareholders Chancellor Allen set out in Katz thus seems far preferable to the odd
formulations espoused in Credit Lyonnais and its progeny.
101

Veasey & Guglielmo, supra note 71, at 1431 (“The obvious tension between the
interests of creditors and those of stockholders is palpable and a vexing challenge for
directors.”).
102
See Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of
Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61
TEX. L. REV. 211 (1982); Marc I. Steinberg & Timothy U. Sharpe, Attorney Conflicts of
Interest: The Need for a Coherent Framework, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (1990).
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B. Will Shareholders Gamble with the Creditors Money?
Chancellor Allen’s justification for the Credit Lyonnais principle rests in large
part on the notion that shareholders will have very different risk preferences than
will creditors.103 Insofar as it goes, of course, the point is indisputable.
Limited liability effectively allows shareholders to externalize risk onto
creditors. Suppose a corporation borrowed $2,000 from a bank to invest. There
are two available investments: A and B, each of which has three possible payoffs: best case, worst case, and break even.104

Investment A
Probability

Nominal Value

Expected Value

Best-case

10%

$3,000

$300

Break-even

80%

$2,000

$1,600

Worst-case

10%

$1,000

Expected Value

$100
$2000

Investment B
Probability

Nominal Value

Expected Value

Best-case

20%

$5,000

$1,000

Break-even

60%

$2,000

$1,200

Worst Case

20%

$0

$0

Expected Value

$2,200

Investment B is the more risky of the two options. Both default risk (the risk that
the company won’t be able to pay back its debt) and volatility risk (the likelihood
of an outcome other than the break-even scenario) are much higher in Investment
B.
In a world of zero transaction costs and unlimited liability—i.e., one in
shareholders are personally liable for corporate debts—the bank would be
indifferent as to which investment the company made. If the company fails, the
bank can simply collect from the shareholder. In a world of limited liability—i.e.,
one in which the shareholders have no liability for the corporation’s contract
debts—the bank will prefer Investment A. Even in the worst case scenario, the
bank will get half its money back, plus there’s a 90% probability the bank will be
repaid in full. The bank will not be impressed that Investment B offers a higher
103

See supra text accompanying note 75 (quoting Allen’s analysis).
The example is a modified version of one used in MICHAEL P. DOOLEY,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 33-34 (1995), which in turn drew on WILLIAM
A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 228-229 (5th
ed. 1992).
104
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expected return, because the bank has no claims on the residual. Anything over
$2,000 goes to the shareholders, not the bank (ignoring interest).
Conversely, shareholders will strongly prefer Investment B. Because creditors
(like the bank) have a prior claim on the firm’s assets and earnings, they get paid
first; shareholders get the residual—whatever is left over. Shareholders thus
prefer projects offering potentially high rate of returns, so there will be something
left over after the creditors get paid.
The problem, of course, is that high return projects usually involve high levels
of risk.105 The greater the risk, the more likely it becomes that the project will be
unsuccessful. In that event, it becomes more likely that the firm’s income will not
suffice to pay the creditors, let alone leave anything over for the shareholders.
Shareholders will not care about Investment B’s greater risk, however, because
the doctrine of limited liability means their personal assets are not at risk. Limited
liability thus generates negative externalities by creating incentives for
shareholders to cause the company to invest in higher risk projects than would the
firm’s creditors. Because shareholders do not put their personal assets at jeopardy,
they effectively externalize some portion of the risk associated with such
investments to creditors.
Although this discrepancy in risk preference is present even in solvent
corporations, it becomes especially pronounced when the corporation is insolvent
or in the vicinity of insolvency.106 Under those conditions, the shareholders may
well be inclined to recall Will Roger’s famous aphorism: “It'
s not so much the
return on my money that concerns me as much as the return of my money.”
Because the corporation is on the edge of a liquidation or reorganization in which
the shareholders are likely to receive neither a return on their investment nor,
more importantly, the return of their investment, they now have an incentive to
cause the corporation to engage in particularly high risk ventures. If the venture
pays off with a substantial return, they may be able to at least recoup their initial
investment in the corporation. If the venture fails, they have lost nothing.
Creditors thus bear the entire risk associated with such ventures.107
105

KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 92, at 45.
See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope
of Directors'Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1489 (1993) (“When the
corporation is insolvent or at the brink of insolvency, the difference in risk preference
between shareholders and creditors is magnified with respect to corporate investment
policies.”).
107
See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669,
683-84 (1993).
106
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This analysis jibes closely with Allen’s justification for the Credit Lyonnais
principle. Recall, for example, his argument that “insolvency can do curious
things to incentives, exposing creditors to risks of opportunistic behavior and
creating complexities for directors,”108 which is precisely what the preceding
analysis suggests will happen. The decision might thus be justified as necessary to
prevent “the shareholders, who were about to wind up with nothing,” from taking
“an unreasonable gamble with the money that would have otherwise gone to the
creditors upon the dissolution of the firm.”109
Unfortunately for the proponents of Credit Lyonnais, the argument suffers
from two major flaws. First, creditors could protect themselves ex ante either by
negotiating contractual limitations on corporate behavior, such as restrictions on
the types of projects in which the firm may invest, or by negotiating for a share of
the up-side, such as through the use of convertible debt securities.110
Alternatively, creditors can force shareholders to internalize those risks by
charging a higher interest rate that compensates the creditor for the higher risk of
default. Indeed, the distinguishing characteristic of voluntary creditors (as
opposed to involuntary creditors) is that they can allow for the risk of default in
the initial contract with the corporation.111 Lenders, for example, factor in the risk
108

Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL
277613 at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. 1991).
109
Morgan N. Neuwirth, Shareholder Franchise—No Compromise: Why the
Delaware Courts Must Proscribe All Managerial Interference with Corporate Voting,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 423, 473 n.273 (1996). See also Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary
Duties of Officers and Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45,
49-51 (1998).
110
Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine observes:
It is presumed that creditors are capable of protecting themselves through the
contractual agreements that govern their relationships with firms. Furthermore, a specific
body of law--the law of fraudulent conveyance--exists precisely to protect creditors.
And, of course, important elements of federal bankruptcy law also protect creditors.
Given that these legal tools exist to protect creditors, our corporate law (and that of most
of our nation) expects that the directors of a solvent firm will cause the firm to undertake
economic activities that maximize the value of the firm'
s cash flows primarily for the
benefit of the residual risk-bearers, the owners of the firm'
s equity capital. So long as the
directors honor the legal obligations they owe to the company'
s creditors in good faith, as
fiduciaries they may pursue the course of action that they believe is best for the firm and
its stockholders.

Production Resources Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 787 (Del. Ch.
2004).
111
Cf. Jonathan C. Lipson, Director'
s Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the
Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1245 (2003) (arguing for
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of default in calculating the interest rate. Thus, it matters little to the lender if an
individual corporation goes bankrupt (assuming diversification of risk). While the
lender will sustain a loss as a result of the transaction with the bankrupt
corporation, it will recoup that loss through the interest rate it receives from other
borrowers. In this way, voluntary creditors pass on the risk of default to the
shareholders, even in a system of limited liability.
Second, the shareholder incentive argument has traction only with respect to
firms in which the shareholders exercise effective control. As such, it has no
application to publicly held corporations, which are characterized by a separation
of ownership and control.112 Instead, the shareholder incentive argument applies
only to closely held corporations or quasi-public corporations in which there is a
controlling shareholder (or shareholder group). And, of course, it is in precisely
such firms where the costs of bargaining between shareholder(s) and creditors
will be low enough to allow the latter to negotiate ex anta particularized
protections, such as shareholder guarantees of corporate debts.
In the true public corporation, with no controlling shareholders, power to
decide whether the firm invests in particular high risk projects thus rests in the
hands of the board of directors and its subordinate managers. It is not clear that
managers will necessarily favor either the interests of shareholders or creditors:
A manager tainted by the company'
s financial problems might prefer to take high
risks because only they could lead to returns sufficiently high to restore the
manager to favor. On the other hand, a manager whose job and company are not
in immediate jeopardy might prefer investments with risks that are lower than
those preferred by the company'
s investors.113

If agency cost economics teaches us anything, however, it causes us to suspect
that at least some managers will put their own interests ahead of those of either
shareholders or creditors at least some of the time.114 As such, the real risk present

greater protection of creditors who have “low levels of volition, cognition, and exit,”
principally involuntary creditors).
112
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 84-89 (1932).
113
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 107, at 684.
114
Of course, various forces will constrain manager incentives. Accordingly, it is not
surprising that LoPucki and Whitford found only very limited evidence that managers of
insolvent corporations were able to exercise control so as to benefit themselves at the
expense of other constituencies. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 107, at 751
(summarizing findings of a study of insolvent corporations).
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when a public corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency is that of managerial
opportunism rather than strategic behavior by shareholders.
C. Which Constituencies Can Help Themselves?
Whether the corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency or not, but perhaps
especially when it is in that neighborhood, boards of directors often face decisions
in which it is not possible to achieve a Pareto optimal result.115 Instead, they often
face decisions that will leave at least one constituency better off but also leave at
least one worse off. Suppose, for example, the board is faced with a decision
having a pay off for one constituency of $150 that leaves another constituency
worse off by $100. As a whole, the organization is better off by $50. In economic
terms, this decision is Kaldor-Hicks efficient.116 What should the board do?
With this background in mind, the shareholder wealth maximization norm can
be described as a bargained-for term of the board-shareholder contract by which
the directors agree not to make Kaldor-Hicks efficient decisions that leave
shareholders worse off. A commonly used justification for adopting Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency as a decision-making norm is the claim that everything comes out in
the wash.117 With respect to one decision, I may be in the constituency that loses,
but next time I will be in the constituency that gains. If the decision-making
apparatus is systematically biased against a particular constituency, however, that
justification fails. If shareholders suspect that their constituency would be
systematically saddled with losses, for example, they will insist on contract terms
precluding directors from making Kaldor-Hicks decisions that leave shareholders
worse off. Specifically, shareholders would bargain for terms imposing fiduciary
duties on directors and officers that incorporate the shareholder wealth
maximization norm.
115

A Pareto superior transaction makes at least one person better off and no one
worse off. See generally DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 15455 (describing Pareto efficiency).
116
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency does not require that no one be made worse off by a
reallocation of resources. Instead, it requires only that the resulting increase in wealth be
sufficient to compensate the losers. Note that there does not need to be any actual
compensation, compensation simply must be possible. ROBERT COOTER AND THOMAS
ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 41-42 (2d ed. 1997).
117
The validity of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a guide to public policy is sharply
disputed. See Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 91-94 (1981); Bruce
Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation, 43 U.
TORONTO L. REV. 547, 554-55 (1993).
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In contractarian theory, fiduciary duties are viewed as gap fillers by which
courts resolve disputes falling through the cracks of incomplete contracts.118 In
particular, fiduciary duties come into play when corporate directors and officers
seek to appropriate quasi-rents through opportunistic conduct unanticipated when
the firm was formed (and, accordingly, not dealt with ex ante by contract). Quasirents arise where investments in transaction specific assets create a surplus subject
to expropriation by the contracting party with control over the assets.119 A
transaction specific asset is one whose value is appreciably lower in any other use
than the transaction in question.120 Once a transaction specific investment has
been made, it generates quasi-rents—i.e., returns in excess of that necessary to
maintain the asset in its current use.121 If such quasi-rents are appropriable by the
party with control of the transaction specific asset, a hold up problem ensues.
Investments in transaction specific assets therefore commonly are protected
through specialized governance structures created by detailed contracts. As we
have seen, however, under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, bounded
rationality precludes complete contracting.122 Under such conditions, accordingly,
fiduciary duties provide an alternative source of protection against opportunism.
The shareholder’s investment in the firm is a transaction specific asset,
because the whole of the investment is both at risk and turned over to someone
else’s control.123 In contrast, many corporate constituencies do not make firm
specific investments in either human capital or otherwise. Because the relationship
between such constituencies and the corporation does not create appropriable quasirents, opportunism by the board is not a concern for them.
Consequently, shareholders are more vulnerable to director misconduct than
are most nonshareholder constituencies. To be sure, some scholars assert that
“when directors use their corporate position to steal money from the firm, every”
constituency suffers.124 Consider, however, a classic case of self-dealing. Assume
118

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 92.
See Benjamin R. Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
120
Bengt Hölmstrom & John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 J.
ECON. PERSP. 73, 74 (1998).
121
Id. at 74 n.1. The asset may also generate true rents—i.e., returns exceeding that
necessary to induce the investment in the first place—but the presence or absence of true
rents is irrelevant to the opportunism problem. See id. (discussing true rents).
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See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1209 (1984).
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Blair & Stout, supra note 39, at 299.
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a solvent corporation able to pay its debts and other obligations (especially
employee salaries) as they come due in the ordinary course of business. Further
assume that the corporation has substantial free cash flow—i.e., cash flows in
excess of the positive net present value investments available to the corporation.
If the directors siphon some portion of the corporation’s free cash flow into their
own pockets, shareholders are clearly hurt, because the value of the residual claim
has been impaired. Yet, in this case, there is no readily apparent injury to the
value of the fixed claim of all other corporate constituents.
For the sake of argument, however, I will assume herein that appropriation of
quasi-rents is an equally severe problem for both shareholders and nonshareholder
constituencies. This is most obvious in the case of employees who invest in firm
specific human capital.125 Creditors may also develop firm specific expertise,
however, particularly in long-term relationships with a significant number of repeat
transactions.126
Relative to many nonshareholder constituencies, shareholders are poorly
positioned to extract contractual protections.127 Unlike bondholders, for example,
whose term-limited relationship to the firm is subject to extensive negotiations
and detailed contracts, shareholders have an indefinite relationship that is rarely
the product of detailed negotiations. The dispersed nature of stockownership,
moreover, makes bilateral negotiation of specialized safeguards especially
difficult:
Arrangements among a corporation, the underwriters of its debt, trustees under
its indentures and sometimes ultimate investors are typically thoroughly
negotiated and massively documented. The rights and obligations of the various
parties are or should be spelled out in that documentation. The terms of the
contractual relationship agreed to and not broad concepts such as fairness
[therefore] define the corporation’s obligation to its bondholders.128
125

Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5 INDUSTRIAL &
CORP. CHANGE 277, 280 (1996).
126
Id.
127
The analysis herein applies mainly to voluntary constituencies of the firm,
although the political process point is not wholly inapt with respect to involuntary
constituencies. In any case, corporate law is an exceptionally blunt instrument with which
to protect involuntary constituencies (and voluntary constituencies, as well, for that
matter). Tort, contract, and property law, as well as a host of general welfare laws,
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Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive
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Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).

Bainbridge, Fiduciary Duties to Creditors

31

Put another way, bond indentures necessarily are incomplete.129 Even so, they still
provide bondholders with far greater contractual protections than shareholders
receive from the corporate contract as represented by the firm’s organic
documents.130
In addition, as implied in the passage just quoted from former Chancellor
Allen’s Katz opinion, the underwriting process ensures that the indenture will
contain efficient protections for bondholders. Some argue that the underwriters
have a pecuniary interest in pleasing the issuer, not the bondholders,131 but the
relationship between underwriters and bondholders is a classic repeat transaction
phenomenon. Underwriters will not sully their reputation with bondholders for the
sake of one issuer.132 In a firm commitment underwriting, moreover, the
underwriters buy the securities from the issuer. If the indenture does not provide
adequate levels of protection, the underwriters will be unable to sell the bonds.133
129

See Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional
Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 234 (1999) (stating that “[a]ll
contracts have gaps”). The claim here is simply that the shareholder-corporation contract
is especially “gappy.” The ownership-like rights conferred by the shareholder’s contract
follow from this phenomenon. Cf. George P. Baker and Thomas N. Hubbard, Empirical
Strategies in Contract Economics: Information and the Boundary of the Firm, AEA
PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS, May 2001, at 189, 192 (finding that technological
developments promoting contractibility within the trucking industry led to vertical
integration).
130
Unlike secured creditors or employees with firm specific human capital, the
shareholder’s transaction specific investment is not associated with particular assets.
Romano, supra note 125, at 279. Also unlike other corporate constituents, shareholders
have no right to periodic renegotiation of the firm’s of their relationship with the firm. As
a result, the shareholders’ interest in the firm is more vulnerable to both uncertainty and
opportunism than are those of other corporate constituents. Unlike those corporate
constituents whose interests are adequately protected by contract, shareholders therefore
require special protection. Hence, both the shareholder right to elect directors and the
fiduciary obligation of those directors to maximize shareholder wealth. See id.
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See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1183 (1990); see also Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More
Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate Over Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 24-26 (noting potential conflicts of interest on the part of underwriters).
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Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW. U.
L. REV. 565, 591-92 (1995).
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Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation'
s Obligations to Creditors, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 660 (1996) (noting that “underwriters negotiate the covenants in
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Portfolio theory further suggests that bondholders are fully compensated for
the risks posed by potential breaches of fiduciary duty. Arguably such risks are
unsystematic in nature, so that the bondholders can eliminate them by holding a
diversified portfolio.134 Even if such risks are characterized as systematic risks,
moreover, the pricing mechanism will ensure a rate of interest that compensates
the bondholders for those risks.
Accordingly, we can confidently predict the majoritarian default that would
emerge from the hypothetical bargain. Shareholders will want the protections
provided by fiduciary duties, while bondholders will be satisfied with the ability
to enforce their contractual rights, which is precisely what the law provides.135
Credit Lyonnais thus threatens to give bondholders a windfall for which they have
not bargained.

strong self-interest in holding down the corporation’s cost of capital—e.g., avoiding
takeovers, maximizing personal wealth, and avoiding the adverse consequences of firm
failure. Because directors and managers cannot diversify away the risk of firm failure, as
shareholders may, they are more risk averse than shareholders with respect to conduct
that could raise the firm’s cost of debt capital. If directors and managers pursue
shareholder wealth at the expense of bondholders, however, such conduct will come back
to haunt management the next time it uses the bond market to raise capital. Coupled with
the fact that their non-diversifiable interest in firm failure means that board and officer
risk preferences typically are closer to those of creditors than of shareholders, their selfinterest provides significant protections for bondholders.
134
Unsystematic risk can be thought of as firm-specific risk. STEPHEN A. ROSS ET
AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 287 (6th ed. 2002). In contrast, systematic risk can be
regarded as market risk, because systematic risks affect all firms to one degree or another.
Id. Investors can eliminate unsystematic risk by diversifying their portfolio. Id. at 288.
Thus, even though the actual rate of return earned on a particular investment is likely to
diverge from the expected return, the actual return on a well-diversified portfolio is less
likely to diverge from the expected return. A well-diversified investor thus need not be
concerned with unsystematic risk and therefore will not demand to be compensated for
that risk. Id. Systematic risk by definition cannot be eliminated by diversification,
because it effects all stocks. Id. Accordingly, investors will demand to be compensated
for bearing systematic risk. Id.
135
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“the relationship between a corporation and the holders of its debt securities, even
convertible debt securities, is contractual in nature”); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Simons v. Cogan,
549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes, Inc., 506 A.2d
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D. Summation
Credit Lyonnais was a doctrinal innovation that departed significantly from
pre-existing Delaware law, which had limited creditors to their bargained-for
contractual rights and obliged directors to focus on shareholder wealth
maximization. As doctrinal innovations go, moreover, Credit Lyonnais was
particularly unsound. It introduced uncertainty into the law, depriving directors of
the ex ante guidance on which Delaware corporate law appropriately prides
itself.136
As a matter of public policy, Credit Lyonnais was equally unsound. Its notion
that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporate entity when that entity is in the
vicinity of insolvency is untenable as a matter of economic theory and difficult to
operationalize in practice. The concern that shareholders will gamble with the
creditors’ money, which implicitly underlies Credit Lyonnais, is unpersuasive. In
corporations where that might be a concern due to the presence of controlling
shareholders able to determine corporate policy, the creditors can protect
themselves ex ante through negotiations with that shareholder, as by insisting on
the shareholder giving a personal guarantee.137 In true public corporations, the
real concern is not shareholder but managerial opportunism. As between
shareholders and creditors, the latter again are better able to protect themselves
136

See Barondes, supra note 109, at 72-73 (discussing how Credit Lyonnais
introduced various sources of uncertainty into the law); Lipson, supra note 111, at 1211
(“The chief criticism is that the holding of the case—if there is one—creates
uncertainty.”); cf. Schwarcz, supra note 133, at 671 (“Directors who are expected to labor
under a dual loyalty must be able to determine when that loyalty arises.”).
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Some scholars contend that trade creditors of a close corporation cannot protect
themselves by bargaining and, accordingly, posit that the rule of limited liability should
be relaxed with respect to them. See, e.g., William P. Hackney and Tracey G. Benson,
Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 837, 860-64 (1982).
The same concern might motivate support for Credit Lyonnais. But concern for trade
creditors is misplaced. Trade creditors concerned about limited liability should simply
raise their interest rates or refuse to transact except on a cash basis. See Schwarcz, supra
note 133, at 663 (pointing out that “trade creditors have various ways to protect
themselves at the initial transaction stage, such as shortening payment terms or requiring
contemporaneous or even prior payment. Trade creditors seeking additional protection
can even demand purchase money security interests to secure repayment.”). If limited
liability increases the risk of default, the lender is fully compensated for that risk by the
higher interest rate. In any event, the transaction costs of differentiating between
incorporated and unincorporated businesses may well not be worth it for trade creditors,
as evidenced by the widespread use of standardized prices and terms by such creditors.
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through ex ante contracting. Credit Lyonnais thus gives bondholders and other
creditors a second bite at the apple.138
In sum, the default rule of corporate law ought to recognize that shareholders
bargained for the right to gamble with the creditors’ money even when the
corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency. Creditors who object to that right can
and should protect themselves ex ante. If they fail to do so, the law should take
the “you made your bed, now you must lie in it” attitude that motivated should
former Chancellor Allen’s Katz opinion rather than following Credit Lyonnais.
IV. Does it Matter?
Consider the facts that were at issue in Katz.139 Oak Industries was in deep
financial trouble, having experienced unremitting losses for the previous 45
months. The common stock’s market price had fallen from $30 to $2 per share
and Oak’s debt traded at substantial discounts to par. In hopes that an infusion of
new equity capital would turn things around, Oak entered into an agreement with
Allied Signal, pursuant to which the latter would purchase certain of Oak’s assets
for $160 million in cash and also would invest an additional $15 million in Oak
by purchasing newly issued common stock and warrants.
Allied Signal conditioned the deal on a restructuring of Oak’s existing debt to
be effected via a tender offer in which Oak would buy back some debt at a
premium over the debt’s then current market price but at a discount to par. Debt
holders accepting the offer would be obliged to execute exit consents authorizing
indenture amendments eliminating various protections, including all financial
covenants. Without the amendments, Allied Signal was unwilling to enter into
either the equity investment or asset purchase.
Assume Oak was in the vicinity of insolvency at the time the restructuring
plan was approved by Oak’s board of directors. A creditor sues the board alleging
breach of the Credit Lyonnais fiduciary duty. The creditor argues that the deal
was structured to disadvantage creditors to the shareholders’ benefit.
To justify that claim, the creditor offers the following analysis of the
transaction’s effect: I hold 5 Oak bonds, each having a par value of $1,000. The
prevailing market price is around $600, but I believe that bondholders would
realize $700 pre bond if Oak was forced into a liquidation or reorganization in
bankruptcy. Oak is offering us $650 per bond in the tender offer, but in order to
138
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accept the offer I must execute a consent that will amend the indenture to
eliminate covenants prohibiting the payment of dividends and the incurrence of
debt senior to my bonds. If I hold onto your bonds, and a majority of other holders
tender, the bonds I will be left with, stripped of their protective covenants, will be
worth $575. I therefore face a classic prisoners’ dilemma. I will accept the $650
offered by Oak, and execute the consent, in order to protect myself against the
risk of winding up with bonds worth only $575.
What standard of review will a Delaware court apply on these facts, assuming
arguendo that the creditor is owed some sort of fiduciary duty under Credit
Lyonnais? The answer almost certainly is the business judgment rule:
The Credit Lyonnais decision'
s holding and spirit clearly emphasized that
directors would be protected by the business judgment rule if they, in good faith,
pursued a less risky business strategy precisely because they feared that a more
risky strategy might render the firm unable to meet its legal obligations to
creditors and other constituencies.140

In other words, so long as the board of directors is independent and disinterested
and otherwise satisfies the preconditions for application of the business judgment
rule, the court will abstain from reviewing the merits of the board’s decision.141
The rationale for applying the business judgment rule in this context follows
in part from the same policy considerations evaluated in the preceding Part:
Creditors are often protected by strong covenants, liens on assets, and other
negotiated contractual protections. The implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing also protects creditors. So does the law of fraudulent conveyance. With
these protections, when creditors are unable to prove that a corporation or its
directors breached any of the specific legal duties owed to them, one would think
that the conceptual room for concluding that the creditors were somehow,
nevertheless, injured by inequitable conduct would be extremely small, if extant.
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Having complied with all legal obligations owed to the firm'
s creditors, the board
would, in that scenario, ordinarily be free to take economic risk for the benefit of
the firm'
s equity owners, so long as the directors comply with their fiduciary
duties to the firm by selecting and pursuing with fidelity and prudence a plausible
strategy to maximize the firm'
s value.142

In addition, and perhaps more importantly, however, application of the
business judgment rule follows necessarily from the basic architecture of
corporate governance. As the Delaware Supreme Court has explained:
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the
fundamental principle, codified in [Delaware General Corporation Law] §
141(a), the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or
under its board of directors.... The business judgment rule exists to protect and
promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware
directors.143

The business judgment rule thus operationalizes the intuition that fiat— i.e.,
centralization of decisionmaking authority—is the essential attribute of efficient
corporate governance.144
As Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow explains, authority and
accountability cannot be reconciled:
[Accountability mechanisms] must be capable of correcting errors but should not
be such as to destroy the genuine values of authority. Clearly, a sufficiently strict
and continuous organ of [accountability] can easily amount to a denial of
authority. If every decision of A is to be reviewed by B, then all we have really is
a shift in the locus of authority from A to B and hence no solution to the original
problem.145

The business judgment rule prevents such a shift in the locus of decision-making
authority from boards to judges. It does so by establishing a limited system for
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case-by-case oversight in which judicial review of the substantive merits of those
decisions is avoided. The court begins with a presumption against review.146 It
then reviews the facts to determine not the quality of the decision, but rather
whether the decision-making process was tainted by self-dealing and the like.147
The questions asked are objective and straightforward: Did the board commit
fraud? Did the board commit an illegal act? Did the board self-deal? Whether or
not the board exercised reasonable care is irrelevant, as well it should be.148 The
business judgment rule thus erects a prophylactic barrier by which courts precommit to resisting the temptation to review the merits of the board’s decision.
As I have explained elsewhere in much more detail,149 judicial abstention
from merits review of board decisions has several critical advantages. First,
judges necessarily have less information about the needs of a particular firm than
do that firm’s directors. A fortiori, judges will make poorer decisions than the
firm’s board. In addition, while market forces work a sort of Darwinian selection on
corporate decision makers, no such forces constrain erring judges.150 As such,
rational shareholders might prefer the risk of managerial error to that of judicial
error.
Second, the firm’s residual claimants do not get a return on their investment
until all other claims on the corporation have been satisfied. All else equal, the
146

See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (explaining that the
rule creates a presumption that the directors or officers of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company).
147
See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. Sup.
1976) (stating that absent “fraud, dishonesty, or nonfeasance,” the court would not
substitute its judgment for that of the directors).
148
See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating: “While it is
often stated that corporate directors and officers will be liable for negligence in carrying
out their corporate duties, all seem agreed that such a statement is misleading....
Whatever the terminology, the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate
directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this reluctance to impose liability for
unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally labeled the business judgment
rule.”); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262-64 (Del. 2000) (rejecting plaintiff’s
contention that the business judgment rule includes an element of “substantive due care”
and holding that the business judgment rule requires only “process due care”).
149
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
150
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 100 (1991).

38

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY LAW

residual claimant—whether it be a shareholder or, in insolvency, a creditor—
therefore will prefer high return projects. Because risk and return are directly
proportional, however, implementing that preference necessarily entails choosing
risky projects. Board decisions rarely involve black-and-white issues, however;
instead, they typically involve prudential judgments among a number of plausible
alternatives. Given the vagaries of business, moreover, even carefully made
choices among such alternatives may turn out badly. Unfortunately, both residual
claimants and judges will find it difficult to distinguish between competent and
negligent management. By virtue of the hindsight bias, bad outcomes are often
regarded, ex post, as foreseeable ex ante. If bad outcomes result in liability,
however, managers will be discouraged from taking risks.151
The critical point for present purposes is that nothing in the preceding précis
of the rationale for the business judgment rule depends on the question “to who
are directors accountable?” There will be an unavoidable tension between
authority and accountability whether directors owe duties to the shareholders, the
creditors, the entity, or some combination thereof. Allowing courts to review the
merits of board decisions will inevitably shift some aliquot of the board’s
authority to courts whether such review is triggered by shareholders, the creditors,
the entity, or some combination thereof. Accordingly, absent a disabling conflict
of interest on the part of the board, the business judgment rule should be the
standard of review whether fiduciary litigation is brought by shareholders, the
creditors, the entity, or some combination thereof.
V. Conclusion
In sum, the zone debate is mostly much ado about nothing. Or, more
precisely, about very little. In the vast majority of cases, the business judgment
rule will preclude judicial review regardless of whether suit is brought by
shareholders or creditors. In some cases, the business judgment rule may not
apply, but suit will be derivative in nature and any recovery will go to the entity
regardless of whether suit is brought by shareholders or creditors. As a result, the
only cases in which the zone of insolvency debate matters are those to which the
business judgment rule does not apply, shareholder and creditor interests conflict,
and a recovery could go to directly to those who have standing to sue. In those
cases, moreover, there is a strong policy argument that creditors should be limited
to whatever rights the contract provides or might be inferred from the implied
covenant of good faith.
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